Foreword by Desai, Lord Meghnad
The current crisis is the first global recession of
the latest phase of globalisation which began in
the last quarter of the twentieth century. This
phase witnessed a boom of 15 years from 1991 to
2007, one of the longest booms in the history of
capitalism but is now going through one of its
deepest crises. But, while deploring the cost of
the crisis, it is well to recall that in the boom
developing countries did benefit enormously.
China and India emerged as powerful economies
with a place at the top table. Asia in general
became a dynamic part of the global economy
thanks to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and the enhanced flow of private capital from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries to Asia. The
flow of private capital, which was roughly around
$200 billion in the early 1990s, had reached $900
billion by 2007. It has now dropped down to
around $200 billion again. African countries
which have been laggards in the globalisation
race were catching up by the beginning of the
twenty-first century – the growth rate of sub-
Saharan Africa reached a respectable 5 per cent
before the crisis hit. 
Given this, the first task of any recovery
programme is to restore the flows of trade and
capital to respectable levels if we are to alleviate
the suffering. There is a need for reform of the
international economic order without doubt, but
such restoration should not disrupt or diminish
the flows of capital, commodities and indeed of
labour. There is an urgent need to restore the
levels of trade credit and some attempt was made
at the G-20 in London in April towards this. It
remains to be seen how soon it will take effect.
There are also many reforms of the financial
system which have to be undertaken at the
national level in the OECD countries and these
need to be coordinated so that there is no
regulation arbitrage. But these reforms, including
recapitalisation of banks, are primarily a rich
country concern. Their impact on developing
countries is felt primarily through a protectionist
tendency for recapitalised banks to cut back on
international lending. This has to be resisted.
Many of these reforms and recovery programmes
are already underway. The urgent challenge now
is to repair the international monetary order. As
is now well known, the origins of the crisis lie
back in the 1990s when many developing
countries ventured into the global financial
markets under the false notion that a dollar peg
made their currency risk free. Thailand’s Baht
crisis, and the ensuing Asian crisis of 1997 was
very damaging and countries began to adopt risk
adverse behaviour accumulating large reserves.
Among these countries were China, South Korea
and Japan. Their surpluses were banked in US
Treasury Bills and it is these that financed the
double deficits during the Bush years from 2001
to 2008. The American economy enjoyed
seigniorage benefits, and cheap credit. Inflation
was averted because the Asian economies,
especially China, could export manufactures at
low cost. This was in marked contrast to the
sixties and seventies, when the rising prices of
manufactures were the main cause of inflation.
Many Keynesian economists pointed out the
effects of monopolistic practices in
manufacturing at the time. 
Globalisation removed this danger by relocating
industry away from the metropolitan countries to
the periphery. This gave Central Bankers the
misleading impression that it was they who were
keeping inflation low when it was the Chinese
worker. But the wild gyrations of asset prices, the
high leveraging of financial firms and the
mismanagement of risks, due to a flawed
understanding of the nature of the financial
innovations, aided and abetted by cheap credit
have led to the present meltdown. Like in 1971
and 1984 and 1991 we are learning the dangers
of relying on the US dollar as the bulwark of the
international monetary order.
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The answer is to create an international reserve
currency which surplus countries can put their
foreign exchange reserves into and from which
deficit countries can borrow. This reserve
currency can be a combination of currencies and
of commodities as Keynes had argued for the
Bancorp. Despite its record in recent years at
managing lending, the IMF may be the most
suitable agency for this task if it is suitably
reformed. Developing countries need the
purchasing power provided by the surplus
savings of China and South Korea et al. In the
last ten years US excess consumption has been
the source of demand for China’s savings. We
should facilitate developing countries to become
the absorbers of China’s surplus savings.
However, achieving major structural changes of
this kind will be difficult because this phase of
globalisation is quite unlike the earlier phase in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. We now live in a world of independent
nation states, not Empires as they were then; the
world does not have a single currency – the Gold
Standard – as it did then; and while the flow of
capital is truly global the flow of labour is not as
unimpeded as it was then. Policy responses to the
crisis must reflect the new and rapidly changing
realities.
To do so requires a detailed understanding of
these realities. This IDS Bulletin presents a range
of recent research about the impact of the crisis
and the policy responses to it. It includes
evidence about how the crisis is affecting the
poor, the implications for social protection, and
the new challenges facing international financial
institutions. It also examines the impact of the
crisis on global trade, and the provision of trade
credit. And it touches on some of the key
geopolitical debates – the role of China in Africa
and the differing understandings of the crisis
between richer and poorer countries. It therefore
makes an important contribution to the key
challenge and great opportunity that this crisis
provides – to refashion economics itself to do a
better job of serving humanity.
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